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Campos, Victor M.
AWR—Assignment #7
Who Says There’s No Disclosure Requirement For All Intellectual Property Law Subjects:
The Case For The Existence Of Disclosure Requirements in Copyright and
Trademark Law?
I.
Introduction
Intellectual property is different from tangible, real property, and possession of
intellectual property is easily disseminated. Thomas Jefferson explained the ease by which
intellectual property can spread. Jefferson said in his writings:
“an individual may exclusively possess [an idea] as long as he keeps it to
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession
of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other
possesses the whole of it. … That ideas should freely spread from one to
another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and
improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire,
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point.”1
Since intellectual property spreads so easily, others are able to use and build upon this
knowledge. People are more apt to create intellectual property if they are incentivized, and,
therefore, they seek protection for their rights in their intellectual property.
The founding fathers appreciated the benefit that increased access to knowledge has on
the greater society.2 They recognized that the spread of intellectual property creates innovation
and advances in society.3 They agreed with Jefferson’s theory and believed that intellectual
property can spread and promote progress and knowledge.4 In order to incentivize creators, they
granted rights to creators in the Constitution. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that:
The Congress shall have Power … [3] To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; … [8]
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.5
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Patent and copyright protection derives from clause 8, while clause 3 allows for
protection of trademarks through Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce. Clause 8
provides patent protection through the phrase “To promote the Progress of the useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Discoveries.”
Clause 3 also provides the copyright protection by using the phrase “To promote the Progress of
Science, by securing for limited Times to Authors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings.” Clause 3, which provides Congress power “to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” enables the protection of
trademarks, as codified in the Lanham Act.6
The substance of the creator’s right in his intellectual property is limited, however. The
limit and extent of the creation must be specifically known in order for protection to be granted.
The creator’s rights will be limited to the extent to which the creator discloses his creation to the
public. This disclosure sets forth the metes and bounds of the covered, protectable subject
matter.
This paper discusses the quid pro quo of disclosure in exchange for a creator’s exclusive
rights in his intellectual property. There is an underappreciated disclosure requirement among
legal scholars and the courts for all intellectual property subjects (copyright, trademark, and
patent). Legal scholars and courts readily agree that there is a disclosure requirement for patents,
but they do not find a corresponding disclosure requirement in either copyright or trademark law.
This paper argues that scholars and courts should recognize a disclosure requirement in
copyright law and trademark law, in addition to the already accepted disclosure requirement in
patent law. Part II of this paper will discuss the disclosure requirement in patent law. Part III
will demonstrate that there is a disclosure requirement in copyright law. Part IV will
demonstrate that there is a disclosure requirement in trademark law.
II.
Patent Disclosure Requirements
In exchange for exclusive rights in a patent, the patent owner must disclose his invention to
the public. In order to receive the exclusive, protectable rights in his patent (for a limited time),
the inventor must meet the disclosure requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112: 1) written
description, 2) enablement requirement, 3) best mode requirement, and 4) the requirement that
the patent applicant particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention. The Supreme Court
and lower courts have solidified this requirement for attaining patent rights. Therefore, courts
are solidly in agreement that in order to attain exclusive rights in a patent, the inventor must
provide public disclosure.
When one receives a patent, the rights he obtains are “a grant to the patentee, his heirs or
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States.”7 The
extent and limit of the protection in the patent is disclosed in the patent specification. The rights
in a patent are significant because an inventor receives the exclusive, protectable rights in his
patent for twenty years.8
The disclosure requirement sets out the exact invention for which the applicant wants
exclusive rights. In exchange for these exclusive rights, the information is publicly disclosed, so
that others may use this patented material in the future in order to promote progress in the useful
arts. The United States Supreme Court stated that:
6
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“[t]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee,
the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that
the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.
Otherwise, a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation
may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage
invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field, and
the public would be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without
being clearly told what it is that limits these rights.”9
The patent specification specifies four distinct disclosure requirements for obtaining a patent:
(1) written description, (2) enablement requirement, (3) best mode requirement, and (4) that the
applicant particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention.10 The patent’s disclosure
establishes the scope and limit of the patent’s claimed subject matter. Each requirement within
the patent specification is designed to provide notice to the public of the invention for which the
inventor seeks protectable rights.
First, the written description establishes the invention’s boundaries for two reasons: (1) to
notify third parties, so that they are able to develop improvements and obtain protection for their
inventions that build upon the inventor’s patent, and (2) to limit the inventor’s ability to seek
patent protection for broader subject matter than that which he disclosed.11 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that “the applicant must also convey with
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that … he or she was in possession of the
invention.”12 The Federal Circuit also stated that drawings alone may satisfy the written
requirement, as long as the drawings were sufficient to notify an ordinary person skilled in the
art as to what the invention is.13
Second, the enablement requirement discloses to the public how to make and use the
invention, so that others are able to improve upon the invention, as well as make and use the
invention after the patent expires.14 By meeting the enablement requirement, the applicant also
demonstrates that he was in possession of the invention at the time of filing.15 The enablement
requirement requires that enough information be given in order for an ordinary person skilled in
the art to make and use the invention to its full scope.16
Third, the best mode requirement adds an additional level of transparency to the disclosure
requirement: not only how to make and use the invention, but also the best way to do so. In
determining the best mode requirement, the Federal Circuit created a two part test: (1) whether
at the time of the filing, the inventor knew of a mode of practicing his invention that he
9
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considered to be better than any other, and (2) if the inventor disclosed that which he knew to be
the best mode.17 The Federal Circuit explained that the best mode does not have to be the actual
best way to do something, assuming there is one, but rather only that which is “contemplated by
the inventor.”18
Fourth, the disclosure requirement for patents requires that the applicant must particularly
point out and distinctly claim the invention. This requirement establishes the limits of the claim
and prevents the inventor from seeking protection for inventions broader than he discloses. The
Federal Circuit explained that “the primary purpose of the requirement is “to guard against
unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as
to their [respective] rights.”19
Therefore, the four distinct disclosure requirements (written description, enablement
requirement, best mode, and particularly point out and distinctly claim) are the quid pro quo for
an inventor to receive exclusive, protectable rights for his invention for twenty years. An
inventor can receive the exclusive rights in his invention, but he must share the invention with
the public, in order to promote the progress of the useful arts.
In 1974, the Supreme Court explained the disclosure requirement.20 In Kewanee Oil, the
plaintiffs sued defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets.21 Defendants were former
employees of one of the plaintiff’s subsidiaries.22 While working for the plaintiff’s subsidiary,
the defendants developed processes for the growth and encapsulation of synthetic crystals,
eventually growing, for the first time, a 17-inch crystal for detecting ionizing radiation.23 While
at the subsidiary, defendants signed non-disclosure agreements for any confidential information
or trade secrets acquired. Several defendants left the subsidiary to form Bicron Corporation, and
others joined Bicron later as employees. Soon after Bicron was created, it successfully grew a
17-inch crystal of its own.24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether state trade
secret protection is pre-empted by federal patent law. In so doing, the Court analyzed the
disclosure requirement for patent law. The Court stated that “the patent laws impose upon the
inventor a requirement of disclosure.”25 The Court reasoned that disclosure was necessary “[t]o
ensure adequate and full disclosure[,] so that upon the expiration of the 17-year period, the
knowledge of the invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to
practice it and profit by its use.”26 The Court explained that the patent laws promote the
“Progress of Science and the useful Arts by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period of
time as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and
development.27 The Court characterized the quid pro quo as the “reward for inventions,”28 and in
order for an inventor to attain the quid pro quo, the patent law requires disclosure of the
invention.
17
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The Supreme Court again explained the disclosure requirement in 1998.29 In Pfaff, the
plaintiff was asked by Texas Instruments to develop a socket device for mounting and removing
semi-conductor chip carriers.30 Plaintiff prepared detailed engineering drawings in order to
make the socket, and reduced his invention to practice.31 After the patent issued, plaintiff sued
Wells Electronics for patent infringement.32 The Court explained the disclosure requirement by
stating that “the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology.”33 The Court
reasoned that disclosure furthers the progress of science by granting to the inventor exclusive,
protectable rights in his invention. The Court stated that “the exclusive right and liberty to make
and use and vend to others to be used [in] their own inventions, … and as matter of
compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and
reducing the same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and
sanctioned by the laws of Congress.”34
The Federal Circuit also explained the disclosure requirement needed in order for an inventor
to achieve exclusive rights in his patent.35 In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, plaintiffs brought a patent
infringement action. The Federal Circuit explained that a “separate requirement to describe
one’s invention is basic to patent law.”36 The Federal Circuit explained that the quid pro quo for
exclusive, protectable rights in a patent is the written disclosure of the patent.37 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that written disclosure “allows the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) to examine applications effectively; courts to understand the invention, determine
compliance with the statute, and to construe the claims; and the public to understand and
improve upon the invention and to avoid the claimed boundaries of the patentee's exclusive
rights.”38
The Federal Circuit later explained that the disclosure requirement is needed in order for an
inventor to receive the quid pro quo of exclusive rights in patent law.39 In Pozen, the plaintiff
developed a method for treating migraine headaches by combining two drugs into a single
tablet.40 Plaintiff acquired three patents for the new drug, Treximet.41 Plaintiff sued defendants,
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, for marketing generic versions of Treximet prior to the
expiration of Pozen’s patents.42 In reviewing Pozen’s infringement claim, the Federal Circuit
explained the written description requirement necessary to achieve the quid pro quo of exclusive
rights in the patent. The Federal Circuit explained that in order to achieve exclusive rights, the
inventor must fully disclose his invention, in order to promote the progress of science.43 The
Federal Circuit explained that the written description is a requirement, so that the specification
29
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adequately describes an invention, such that it reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary skill in
the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention.44 In return for the disclosure,
the inventor will achieve the exclusive rights of the patent.
It is undisputed that there is a disclosure requirement in patent law. Courts have solidified
that the specification requirements laid out in 35 U.S.C. § 112 are needed in order for an inventor
to receive exclusive rights in his invention. By providing the written description, enablement
requirement, best mode requirement, and particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
invention, the inventor meets the disclosure requirement. The disclosure requirements in § 112
are the quid pro quo needed for the exclusive rights.
III.
Case for Copyright Disclosure Requirements
There is an overall misunderstanding that copyright law does not have a disclosure
requirement. I argue that there is an underappreciated disclosure requirement in copyright law:
Copyright registration. Scholarship is full of criticism contrary to the existence of a public
disclosure requirement for copyrights. However, just as in patent law, the purpose of the
disclosure requirement is to establish the metes and bounds of the protection requested by the
creator for his copyrighted work. The protection granted will enable others to build upon the
works, and after the protection expires, to use the work itself. Additionally, fixation in a tangible
medium of expression does not meet the level of disclosure needed to receive exclusive rights in
one’s copyrightable work. Fixation merely makes something copyrightable. Therefore, I argue
that in order for the author to receive exclusive rights in copyright, his quid pro quo for
disclosure is to have his work registered in the Copyright Office.
The owner of copyrighted material has the following rights in his copyrighted work:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.45
The duration of the rights is even more significant than for patent protection. The exclusive
rights for a copyright owner extend for the life of the author, plus 70 years.46
In order for an author to have a copyright in his work, the only requirements are fixation in a
tangible medium of expression.47 Once an author has fixed his expression of an idea onto a
tangible medium of expression, even for a transitory time, his work is copyrightable. However,
44
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if an author wants to enforce his rights in his copyrighted work as to against all others (his quid
pro quo), his work must be registered. Therefore, an author may technically have a copyright
once the expression is fixed in a tangible medium of expression; however, he has no enforceable
rights in the copyright until the copyright has been registered. Hence, the quid pro quo for
exclusive rights in his copyrighted work is disclosure, and the disclosure requirement of
copyrighted works is the registration of the copyright.
The scholarship is ripe with examples rebuking the notion that copyright law contains no
disclosure requirement. Professor John Cady stated that “unlike patent law, copyright law does
not have a disclosure requirement.”48 Professor Richard Zerbe explained that “[copyright rights]
are granted without a disclosure requirement because copyright protection attaches once the
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”49 He also explained that “this missing
disclosure requirement is an aberration of the copyright law.”50 Professor Sharon Sandeen added
that “the Copyright Act does not require authors to publicly disclose their works.”51 David
Leuttgen explained that “copyright law does not need disclosure requirements because of the
very fact that the subject matter of copyright is communicative.”52 Stephen Davidson added that
“unlike the patent laws, the objective of the copyright laws is not disclosure, but rather the
reduction of ideas to original forms of expression.”53 Further, Brett Frischmann and Dan Moylan
added that there is an “absence of an explicit disclosure requirement in copyright law.”54
This belief is not quite correct. If the owner of a copyrighted work wants protection for his
copyrighted works, he must publicly disclose that for which he wants protection. This
requirement is no different than the requirement for patent protection. In order for an inventor to
receive rights in his patent, he must disclose the limits and scope of the invention.55 This would
be analogous to an inventor who did not disclose his patent, according to the requirements of the
patent law, attempting to later claim patent rights on another’s invention after that other’s work
has been created. The inventor attempting to enforce rights would be barred from claiming he
had patent protection, since he did not meet the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The
same bar applies for copyrighted works. The owner of a copyrighted work must have made
public disclosure of the subject matter for which he wants protection. That public disclosure is
given through the registration requirement for copyrights.
Congress has made it clear that there is a public disclosure requirement for copyrighted work.
The Copyright Act states that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title.”56 This requirement bars anyone who has not met the public
48
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Tech. J. 15, 35 (2003).
49
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disclosure requirement from bringing an action against another for rights in the copyright, further
strengthening the quid pro quo of exclusive rights with disclosure.
Court after court has solidified the registration requirement. The Supreme Court has held
that a precondition to enforcing an owner’s rights in copyright (by filing a copyright
infringement claim) is the Copyright Act’s registration requirement.57 Circuit courts have
followed this precedent, with the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits further reinforcing
the registration requirement.58
Therefore, it is undisputable that there is a disclosure requirement in copyright law in order
for a copyright owner to attain the quid pro quo of exclusive rights in his copyrighted work:
Copyright registration. Just as in patent law, an author can receive exclusive rights in his
copyrighted work, but he must first share the work with the public, in order to promote the
progress of science.
In order for an author to have his work registered, he must have fixed his expression in a
tangible medium for longer than a transitory duration. Hence, while his work may be
copyrightable once it is fixed in a tangible medium, the author does not attain exclusive,
protectable rights in his copyright until the copyrighted work is registered.
The Supreme Court has set forth the pre-condition of registration, prior to an author
obtaining protectable copyright rights.59 In Reed Elsevier, the plaintiffs were freelance authors
who sued defendant publishers for infringement because the publishers had electronically printed
their works without prior permission.60 While some of the works were registered, there were
works that were not registered.61 The Court explained that Congress is given power ““[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the
exclusive Right to ... their ... Writings.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.”62 The Court cited Section 411(a) of the
Copyright Act by stating that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title.”63 The Court went on to hold that Section 411(a) imposes a
precondition to filing a claim.64
The Seventh Circuit also weighed in on the fact that registration is required prior to an author
attaining rights in a copyrightable work.65 In Johnson, plaintiff was a singer-songwriter who
sued defendants that used a portion of his song in their own song.66 Plaintiff, however, never
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registered the copyright of his song.67 The Seventh Circuit explained that in order for a song to
be entitled to copyright protection, the copyright must be registered.68 The Seventh Circuit
explained that a necessary precondition to filing a copyright infringement claim is that the
copyright be registered in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).69
The Eleventh Circuit also reviewed the requirement of copyright registration in order for a
copyright owner to have rights in the copyrighted work.70 In Oravec, the copyright owner sued
architects and several developers for copyright infringement.71 The Eleventh Circuit explained
that the goal of copyright protection is to encourage creation of original works, while promoting
the free flow of ideas and information.72 Further, the Eleventh Circuit held that registration is a
prerequisite for an infringement action.73
Protection is provided for authors, in order to promote the Constitutional goal of the progress
of science. Therefore, in order for one to attain protectable, enforceable rights in his
copyrightable work, there is a quid pro quo requirement that his work must be registered.
Registration discloses to the world that the specific work that is requested to be protected under
copyright law. Hence, just as in patent law, there is a disclosure requirement for copyright, even
though scholars disagree.
Therefore, I argue that copyright registration is an underappreciated disclosure requirement
in copyright law. Although scholarship decries the existence of a public disclosure requirement
for copyrights, the courts’ holdings state otherwise. If a copyright owner wants to receive
exclusive rights in his work, he must dictate the metes and bounds of his work, so that others
may build upon the work and use the work itself after the protection expires. Further, fixation in
a tangible medium of expression does not meet the level of disclosure needed to receive
exclusive rights in one’s copyrightable work. Thus, in order for the owner of a copyrightable
work to receive exclusive rights in copyright, his quid pro quo for disclosure is to have his work
registered in the Copyright Office.
IV.
Case for Trademark Disclosure Requirements
Similarly to copyright law, there is lack of appreciation that trademark law has a disclosure
requirement. I argue that the quid pro quo disclosure requirement needed to receive exclusive
rights in a trademark is actual use in interstate commerce. Protection of trademark rights derives
from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The scholarly belief is that trademark law
contains no disclosure requirement. Once again, just as in copyright and patent law, the purpose
of the disclosure requirement is to establish the metes and bounds of the protection requested by
the creator for his mark. The disclosure of the mark to the public occurs when the mark is used
in interstate commerce. The requirement that an applicant have a duty of candor to the Patent
and Trademark Office does not meet the disclosure requirement of actual use. Additionally,
although trademarks are able to be registered, registration does not meet the required level of
public disclosure needed to receive protectable, exclusive rights. Thus, in trademark law, the
quid pro quo for exclusive, protectable rights in trademark is the actual use of the mark in
interstate commerce.
67
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Trademark protection is given through the Congress’ power to regulate Commerce among
the several States.74 The Lanham Act gives owners of trademarks exclusive, protectable rights
for protection against the unauthorized use of their trademarks. The pertinent text reads
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not
be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been
committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
15 U.S.C. § 1114.
The jurisdictional hook of interstate commerce was incorporated in the language of the
Lanham Act. Congress explained that “[t]he word “commerce” means all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress.”75 Therefore, the ability for a trademark owner to attain
exclusive rights in his mark derives from Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution.
The duration of the rights in trademarks is potentially the longest of any intellectual property
subject matter. The exclusive rights for a trademark owner could possibly extend to perpetuity.76
In order to attain these rights, the quid pro quo of disclosure is required. For trademark law, the
disclosure requirement is actual use in interstate commerce.
As in copyright law, the scholarly belief is that there is no disclosure requirement for
trademarks. There is a large amount of scholarly criticism that trademark law does not have a
disclosure requirement. In stating that there was no disclosure requirement for trademarks,
Vincent Palladino argued for a disclosure requirement for trademarks.77 Michael Weicher also
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suggested for a disclosure requirement for trademarks.78 In hearings before Senate, it was
suggested that a disclosure requirement be added to the Lanham Act.79 Also, Brian Peterman
proposed a disclosure requirement for trademark protection.80 Palladino, Weicher, and Peterman
argue that trademarks should be disclosed to the public, so that consumers are able to identify the
source of the goods and services. They argue that this disclosure will lead consumers to not be
confused in the marketplace. However, actual use in interstate commerce already serves the
purpose of identifying the source of goods and services.
Some may argue that the requirement in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that
applicants have complete candor constitutes a disclosure requirement. The case usually cited as
establishing a duty of candor in the PTO is T.A.D. Avanti, Inc. v. Phone-Mate, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q.
648 (C.D. Cal. 1978). In T.A.D. Avanti, the court explained that the plaintiff’s president could
not have vouched for the mark in his registration, and therefore, the court invalidated the
registration. The court explained the following:
“[a]n applicant for registration of a trademark is required to exercise
uncompromising candor in his communications with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, lest any registration he obtains will be
invalid and/or unenforceable. He must not only refrain from making false
representations to the United States Patent and Trademark Office, but
must make full disclosure of all facts to his knowledge which might bear
in any way on the Office's decision to grant the registration sought.”
Id. at 655.
The court made clear that the duty of candor only refers to knowledge which might bear on the
PTO’s registration decision. The duty of candor, though, does not create an affirmative
disclosure requirement for content of the trademark sought.
The duty to candor to the PTO, therefore, would not rise to the level of disclosure necessary
to constitute public disclosure. Professor Susan Richey explained the fallacy that the duty of
candor could rise to the level of a disclosure requirement.81 Professor Richey explained that the
applicant’s duty of candor does not equate to an affirmative duty to disclose facts material to
registration proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.82 Professor
Richey further explained that the Lanham Act is silent on the issue of disclosure.83 She
concluded that “the obligation not to lie is different than an affirmative obligation to produce
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relevant information.”84 Additionally, Professor Richey provided numerous examples where
case law explained that the duty of candor is not equivalent to public disclosure of the
trademark.85
Another argument that may be made is that trademark registration could meet the public
disclosure requirement. Like copyrights, trademarks are able to be registered.86 However,
trademark registration is not a public disclosure requirement; rather, registration merely provides
the presumption of validity of a trademark.87 The Fifth Circuit explained this concept.88 In
Amazing Spaces, the plaintiff brought an action for trade dress infringement for defendant’s use
of the mark.89 The Fifth Circuit explained that “proof of the registration of a mark with the PTO
constitutes prima facie evidence that the mark is valid and that the registrant has the exclusive
right to use the registered mark in commerce with respect to the specified goods or services.”90
The Ninth Circuit expanded on the presumption.91 In Zobmondo, the Ninth Circuit explained
that the presumption of validity is a “strong one.”92
Besides there existing a strong presumption of validity, trademark registration also provides
benefits for registration. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explained the benefits of
registration.93 In In re McGinley, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated that the
benefits of registration:
“include public notice of the mark in an official government publication
and in official records which are distributed throughout the world,
maintenance of permanent public records concerning the mark,
84
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availability of Customs Service for blocking importation of infringing
goods, access to federal courts where there is a presumption of validity of
the registration ..., notices to the registrant concerning maintenance of the
registration, and, to some extent, direct government protection of the mark
in that the PTO searches its records and refuses registration to others of
conflicting marks. Apart from nominal fees, these costs are underwritten
by public funds.”
In re Robert L. McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (CCPA 1981).
The Fourth Circuit also explained some of the benefits conferred by trademark registration. The
Fourth Circuit explained that “registration confers certain benefits on the owner, such as serving
as prima facie evidence of the mark's validity and entitling the owner of the mark to proceed on
an in rem basis under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).”94 In light of
the presumption of validity and the benefits that registration provides, registration is encouraged
as one of the purposes of the Lanham Act.95
Although trademark registration provides a rebuttable presumption of validity, as well as
numerous benefits, registration does not satisfy the disclosure that trademark protection requires.
In order to attain the quid pro quo of exclusive, protectable rights in a trademark, the trademark
owner must publicly disclose the trademark by actual use in commerce. The Fourth Circuit
elaborated on this principle.96 The Fourth Circuit explained that “it is the use of a mark, not its
registration, that confers trademark protection.”97
Therefore, it follows that there is a disclosure requirement as a quid pro quo in exchange for
exclusive rights for trademark protection: actual use the mark in interstate commerce. The level
of usage must meet a statutory level: “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of
trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”98 Congress explained its reasoning in
the Lanham Act:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks
in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce
from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons
engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud
and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide
rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting
trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the
United States and foreign nations.
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15 U.S.C. § 1127.
The Second Circuit explained that protection for rights in trademark emanate from the
mark’s actual use in commerce.99 In United We Stand, plaintiff brought a trademark
infringement action against defendants for its mark.100 The Second Circuit explained that “use in
commerce” denotes Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1, cl.
3, to regulate the use of trademarks.101 The Second Circuit explained that in order for a
trademark owner to obtain protectable, enforceable rights in his mark, the quid pro quo for
protection required that the mark must be used in commerce.102 In requiring an actual use in
commerce, a trademark owner must publicly disclose to the public his trademark if he wishes to
receive protection for the mark.
The Ninth Circuit also explained that use in commerce is a prerequisite to obtaining
protectable rights in the mark.103 In Levi Strauss, plaintiff brought a trademark infringement
action against defendant for its stitching design.104 The Ninth Circuit explained that “[t]he owner
of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to an injunction against another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2005).”105 The Ninth Circuit explained
that a trademark owner obtains protectable rights in his mark through actual use in commerce.106
The owner’s ability to attain protectable rights apply only after the mark has been used in
commerce, or publicly disclosed.
Another Ninth Circuit case describes the use in commerce requirement for obtaining the quid
pro quo of protectable rights under trademark law.107 In Karl Storz Endoscopy, the
manufacturer of rigid endoscopes brought a trademark infringement suit against a repair
company.108 In evaluating the plaintiff’s right in his trademark, the Ninth Circuit stated that in
order for a mark to be protectable, it must have been used in interstate commerce.109 The Ninth
Circuit even went on to describe what constitutes “use in commerce.”110 The Ninth Cicuit stated
that “a mark is used in commerce when (1) the mark has been placed on the goods or their
containers, labels or the documents associated with the goods or their sale, and (2) the goods are
‘sold or transported in commerce.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1127.”111 The reason that a mark must be used
in commerce in order to attain protectable rights is that the mark must be disclosed to the public
through actual use in commerce.
District Courts have also added to the reasoning for the use in commerce requirement.112 In
S Industries, the Northern District of Illinois explained why use in commerce is required in order
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for one to attain protectable rights in the mark.113 The Northern District of Illinois stated that
“[u]nder the common law, ownership is conferred on ‘the person who employs the first actual
use of a mark in a genuine commercial transaction.’”114 The reason for the first actual use is that
in order for a trademark owner to attain protection in his mark, his mark must be publicly
disclosed. The court in DSMR, further explained the requirement of use in commerce.115 The
court explained that in order for one to attain protectable rights in a mark, “one must win the race
to the marketplace to establish exclusive use of the mark.”116 Once again, the court stated this in
order to reinforce the requirement that the mark be publicly disclosed in order to attain the quid
pro quo of trademark protection.
Courts have further solidified that trademark protection derives from actual use in commerce.
The granting of the exclusive rights in trademarks comes from actual use in interstate commerce.
Courts and scholars have provided numerous examples demonstrating the fact that exclusive
rights in trademark are allowable only after the mark has been used in interstate commerce.117
Protection is provided for trademark owners through Congress’ power to regulate interstate
commerce. In order for a trademark owner to obtain that protection, he must publicly disclose
his mark through the actual use of the mark in commerce. Use of the mark in commerce
discloses to the world the work that subject matter which is requested to be protected. Hence,
just as in patent law, there is a disclosure requirement for trademark law as well.
In conclusion, the quid pro quo disclosure requirement needed to receive exclusive rights in a
trademark is actual use in interstate commerce. Even though the scholarly belief is that
trademark law contains no disclosure requirement, I argue that in order for an owner of a
trademark to obtain exclusive, protectable rights in his mark, he must use the mark in interstate
commerce. The actual use establishes the metes and bounds of the protection requested by the
creator for his mark and discloses the mark to the public. An applicant’s duty of candor to the
Patent and Trademark Office does not satisfy the disclosure requirement of actual use.
Additionally, trademark registration does not meet the necessary level of public disclosure
needed to receive protectable, exclusive rights. Thus, in trademark law, the quid pro quo for
exclusive, protectable rights in one’s trademark is the actual use of the mark in interstate
commerce.
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V.
Conclusion
Scholars and courts are resolute in the belief that there is no disclosure requirement for
copyright or trademark law. However, when one wishes to exercise his rights in his intellectual
property, the scope of the protected material must be specified. The level of specification
required is specified by the disclosure requirement. In order for someone to enforce his rights in
his copyrighted work, he must register his copyright with the Copyright Office. Therefore, the
disclosure requirement for copyright is copyright registration. Similarly, in order for someone to
enforce his rights in his trademark, he must have used his mark in commerce. Hence, trademark
protection is granted where a trademark owner has actually used his mark in interstate
commerce. Analogously, in order for someone to enforce his rights in his patent, he must have
disclosed his invention in accordance with 12 U.S.C. § 112. Therefore, copyright, trademark,
and patent law all have the quid pro quo of disclosure in order to receive protection for the
underlying intellectual property. The fact that there is a disclosure requirement in all subjects of
intellectual property law is underappreciated, and scholars and courts should recognize the
existence of disclosure requirements for each.
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